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Abstract: We find that landlords practice subtle discrimination in the rental 
housing market through the use of language associated with describing and 
viewing a unit, inviting further correspondence, making a formal greeting, and 
using polite language when replying to e-mail inquiries from a white name 
more often than to an African American name, they also send longer e-mails 
and respond quicker to white names. 
Highlights:  
 We test for subtle discrimination using matched-pair audit 
experiments.  
 We examine e-mail text of landlord correspondence.  
 Landlords use positive language to encourage whites and not African 
Americans.  
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 Landlords send longer e-mails and respond quicker to whites than 
African Americans. 
Keywords: Discrimination; Field experiment; Housing; Race 
I. Introduction 
“work ref. rental ref. name address and ss#” 
“its avail give me your # and I will have my daughter show it to 
you” 
The quotes above are e-mail responses from the same landlord 
to separate inquiries for the same rental housing unit. Why the 
difference in response? They are replies to inquiries from (fictitious) 
men with different names – Tremayne Williams, and Brett Murphy, 
respectively – leading the landlord to believe the inquiry generating 
the first response came from an African American man, and the inquiry 
generating the second response came from a white man. The 
difference in these quotes represents unequal treatment of home-
seekers that would not be uncovered in measures that only examine if 
a landlord responds to rental housing inquiries. 
The quotes above suggest a form of subtle discrimination, 
defined by Charles (1999) as unequal treatment between groups that 
occurs but is difficult to quantify, and may not always be identifiable 
through common measures such as price differences. Subtle 
discrimination is particularly difficult to measure in housing market 
transactions where interaction (face to face, and telephone) cannot be 
practically measured on a large scale; nonetheless, landlords may use 
subtle discrimination to discourage minority clients from pursuing 
housing options. Traditional response/non-response measures in e-
mail audit studies ignore subtle discrimination, and likely 
underestimate discrimination by mistaking treatment that appears 
equal for treatment that is different.1 
We contribute to the literature on racial discrimination in 
housing markets by using the text and timing of replies from an audit-
style experiment conducted through e-mail contact with landlords to 
identify subtle forms of discrimination. Our work builds on work by 
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Hanson and Hawley (2011) that examines the response/non-response 
discrimination from landlords in the rental housing market. 
We find that landlords reply faster, and with an e-mail that is 
longer to inquiries made from white names. We also find that landlords 
are more likely to use language associated with describing and viewing 
a unit, inviting further correspondence, use polite language more 
often, and make a formal greeting more often when replying to e-mail 
inquiries from a white home seeker. We find no statistically significant 
evidence (although individual cases sometimes show otherwise) that 
landlords use language associated with mentioning fees, asking for 
employment or rental history, or request background information as a 
means of discrimination. 
The remainder of the paper begins by discussing the previous 
literature on housing market discrimination and places our work in 
context. Section 3 describes the experiment that generates the data 
we use for analysis. Section 4 details how we measure subtle 
discrimination through e-mail correspondence and Section 5 discusses 
the results. The final section of the paper concludes. 
II. Previous literature on housing discrimination 
Much of the previous literature on housing market discrimination 
focuses on quantifiable actions of real estate agents—showing the unit 
auditors originally inquired about, or a count of homes shown. 
Prominent examples in the literature include Yinger, 1986, Ondrich et 
al., 1989 and Zhao, 2005. These studies answer the question does 
discrimination occur in the housing market with an emphatic “yes.” 
Many of these same studies also begin to answer the question of 
how discrimination occurs by taking a closer look at the interaction 
between real estate agents and potential clients. Ondrich, Stricker, 
and Yinger (1989) use the 1989 Housing Discrimination Study (HDS) 
to analyze discriminatory actions of real estate agents. The authors 
propose three main types of behaviors agents can use to discriminate 
against minority clientele: information given about which units are 
available, facilitating the sale of a unit, and the geographic location of 
housing units shown or recommended. They quantify the acts of 
discrimination by likelihood of brokers doing various actions—calling 
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back, asking about income, follow-up calls, asking about needs, 
financial assistance, invitations to inspect the advertised unit, and 
mentioning the advertised unit is available. The authors find real 
estate agents discriminate in all cases. These behaviors measure how 
discrimination occurs; however, there are still subtle differences in the 
way an agent can carry out those actions towards minorities that they 
do not quantify. For example, if a landlord makes a follow-up call to 
both white and minority auditors in the study, the agent may be more 
encouraging or use different tactics to entice the white client to visit 
again. The language used during these exchanges is not recorded, so 
it is impossible to say if there are subtle forms of discrimination 
happening in addition to the more overt discrimination. 
Yinger (1998) discusses the evidence found on discriminatory 
actions in housing, automobile, and fast food markets. In the housing 
market, Yinger highlights significant discriminatory behavior in both 
the sales and rental markets. Agents exclude available units, show 
fewer units, make fewer call backs, signal less positive comments 
about the units, and are less likely to discuss financial incentives or 
help with minority home seekers. These results do indicate ways 
agents can discriminate, yet, within each action, an agent can still use 
subtle discrimination against minorities. The researcher has no way of 
knowing this type of discriminatory behavior since the actions of the 
agent are not recorded nor is the auditor asked to discuss these types 
of agent behaviors. Zhao (2005) uses the 2000 HDS to examine real 
estate brokers’ choices of how many homes to show a potential client. 
He finds blacks and Hispanics are shown 30% and 10% fewer homes, 
respectively. This difference is mainly attributed to white customer’s 
prejudice. 
The research based on in-person audits is limited to what 
information is recorded at the time of the study by auditors. It is 
possible that the real estate agents in these studies also found more 
subtle ways to discourage their African American customers or 
encourage white customers through vocabulary, body language or 
other means. If subtle discrimination exists in addition to the 
quantifiable discrimination these studies find, they may underestimate 
the unequal treatment that actually occurs in housing market 
transactions. We extend the measure of unequal treatment by 
examining a precise record detailing the communication between 
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auditors and landlords. We use this record to test for differences in the 
language used to respond to each auditor, correspondence length (a 
measure of landlord effort), and the time elapsed between 
correspondences. 
Previous housing market studies based on e-mail 
correspondence examine response/non-response discriminatory 
actions. Carpusor and Loges (2006) find Arab and African American 
sounding names are significantly less likely to receive a response from 
potential landlords. They briefly discuss how landlords choose to 
respond negatively to clients. In their study, when a negative response 
occurred, Arab-sounding names were statistically more likely to 
receive an overt response than whites—a response indicating the unit 
is not available. African Americans were also more likely to receive no 
response than whites. 
Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008 and Ahmed et al., 2008, and 
Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2009) formulate e-mail correspondence 
studies to examine racial and sexual preference discrimination in the 
Swedish housing market. Each paper applies the standard 
response/non-response outcome as the discriminatory action in 
addition to a measure of the intensity of response, yet, they do not 
examine wording or amount of contact between landlords and 
auditors. Ahmed et al., 2010 and Bosch et al., 2010 employ e-mail 
correspondence studies where the information about the potential 
tenant is varied to examine if the additional information reduces 
discrimination. They find including positive information about the 
auditors reduces gross discrimination while net discrimination remains 
the same, but do not examine e-mail text. For a complete review on 
the use of field experiments to test for discrimination across all 
markets see Riach and Rich (2002). 
III. Experiment design 
The experiment is a matched-pair design or audit, where we 
send inquiries about available rental housing to landlords. Each 
landlord receives two e-mails- one sent from an e-mail address using a 
white name, the other sent from an e-mail address using an African 
American name. The experiment manipulates the racial group (African 
American or white) of home-seekers through the name associated with 
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an e-mail inquiry made to landlords who advertise rental housing on-
line. Landlords are exposed to the name (race) of the home-seeker in 
three different ways: from the e-mail address, from the name-plate in 
the landlords’ inbox, and in the signature of each e-mail. 
The sample of names comes from Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2004), who use Massachusetts birth certificate data from 1974 to 
1979 to identify names that have a high likelihood of association with 
only one race. The first names used to represent white home-seekers 
are Brad, Brendan, Brett, Matthew, Neil, Geoffrey, Todd, Greg, and 
Jay. The first names used to represent African American home seekers 
are Darnell, Hakim, Jamal, Jermaine, Kareem, Leroy, Rasheed, 
Tremayne, and Tyrone. Last names also follow Bertrand and 
Mullainathan. The last names for white home-seekers are Davis, Ryan, 
Murphy, O’Brien, Baker, McCarthy, Young, Jones, and Wright. The last 
names used to represent African American home-seekers are Johnson, 
Washington, Robinson, Jackson, Hall, Parker, Williams, Jones, and 
Cooper. 
To test for subtle discrimination we search the text of e-mail 
replies for keywords, measure the length (number of words) of replies, 
and the time elapsed between the inquiry and response. Table 1 
details the keyword categories that we use to describe the content of 
each response. Our tests for subtle discrimination use the same 
experiment and data generated by Hanson and Hawley (2011) to test 
for response/non-response discrimination; we extend their analysis to 
examine the text of e-mail replies more carefully. 
The venue for the experiment is the popular classified 
advertisement website Craigslist (http://www.craigslist.org); we use 
advertisements from Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Washington, 
D.C., Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Seattle, and San Francisco. 
Craigslist allows participants to place and reply to on-line 
advertisements specific to local markets for jobs, housing, 
companionship, and other goods and services. Landlords may create 
an advertisement for their property for no monetary cost, and home-
seekers may reply to an unlimited number of advertisements for no 
monetary cost.2 The audits use only listings pertaining to the rental 
housing market. 
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All e-mail inquiries are sent between 9 am and 12 pm on the 
day after a landlord posts an advertisement (always a Wednesday). 
Inquiries are sent from g-mail account addresses in the following 
format: firstname.lastname.###@gmail.com, where ### is a three-
digit number unique to each name. The experiment consists of 4728 
audits, or 9456 e-mail inquiries. The overall response rate to e-mail 
inquiries is 53.9%, with 63.6% of landlords responding to at least one 
e-mail inquiry from a pair of e-mails. We limit our analysis to using 
3153 audits from the original experiment that include one African 
American and one white name, the original experiment also includes 
audits with two white or two African American names with different e-
mail quality. 
IV. Measuring subtle discrimination from e-mail 
correspondence 
An on-line venue provides a cost effective way to record the 
correspondence (or lack of correspondence) and timing of the 
correspondence landlords send in response to inquiries for rental 
housing. We use the actual text of e-mails sent by landlords in this 
paper as a way to test for subtle discrimination. This allows us to go 
beyond tradition response/non-response measures of discrimination 
and test for differences in how landlords respond across racial groups. 
We know of no specific guide to measuring subtle 
discrimination, in fact the academic literature is so thin on this topic 
that researchers often rely on fictitious examples to define it (Rowe, 
1990) or rely on self-reported survey data to measure its existence 
(Fox and Stallworth, 2005). There are a few studies of subtle 
discrimination in the labor market that offer some suggestions, 
including Levinson, 1975 and Bendick et al., 1991, and Bendick and 
Jackson (1994). These studies examine differences in the type of 
response and interactions actors have in matched-pair audits with 
potential employers on the phone and in-person. These studies 
measure subtle discrimination by the incidence of positive and 
negative comments made during a job interview, if interviewers made 
discouraging comments about the applicants chances of being hired, if 
interviewers were polite, the length (in minutes) of the interview, and 
the topics discussed during the interview. In the housing market, 
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Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1989) examine qualitative face-to-face 
real estate agent and client interactions, broken into two broad 
categories: unit availability and sales facilitation, we incorporate each 
of these measures into our search for subtle discrimination. 
We categorize our correspondence measures into three broad 
categories: content of response, time to response, and length of 
response. For time to response, we measure both the average length 
between inquiry and response and the percentage of landlords who 
take longer to respond to each race. For the length of response, we 
measure the number of words contained in the response, and the 
percentage of landlords who write a longer reply to each race. 
Analogous to the labor market studies, we separate the content 
of landlord responses into positive and negative categories, and do 
keyword searches to determine the incidence of differential treatment. 
We further divide our searches into sub-categories to reflect both 
differential treatment associated with unit availability and sales 
facilitation as examined in Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger. Our positive 
categories measure favorable landlord treatment along several 
dimensions including if landlords describe the unit in a positive way, if 
they mentioned other available units, if they invited further contact, 
and if they used generally friendly language. Negative search 
categories measure landlord treatment along dimensions that focus on 
responding unfavorably to one group, including if landlords are more 
likely to mention fees, or ask for more information from a perspective 
tenant such as questioning their employment or background. 
To objectively measure the content of response, we examine the 
text of each e-mail by using automated searches for keywords. For the 
“descriptive” sub-category we searched for terms commonly used to 
describe the housing unit in positive terms. For instance, a landlord 
may describe “new” carpet, or a “clean” neighborhood. The “other 
units” sub-category intends to capture a landlord’s willingness to 
provide information about additional rental units that may be 
available. The sub-category “view unit” combines searches for several 
terms associated with a landlord making an invitation to view the unit. 
“Email” and “Phone” capture the landlords inclusion of language 
associated with invitation to make further contact. The “greeting” 
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category includes search terms for friendly greetings, and the “polite” 
category includes search terms for friendly valedictions. 
Searches for negative language focused on requests for more 
information or mentions of fees. The sub-category “fees” combines 
searches for words that mention application fees or a deposit amount 
or requirement. “Employment” is a sub-category search for terms that 
ask (or imply) the landlord is looking for some verification of 
employment. The “history” sub-category encompasses a landlord’s 
inquiry for more information about the rental or eviction history of the 
tenant. “Background” combines searches for terms that suggest the 
landlord is asking for a criminal background, or other verification. 
Table 1 details the sub-categories for positive and negative 
language and describes the search terms in each sub-category. For all 
sub-category searches we count whether a particular e-mail includes 
any of the terms in each sub-category, we do not account for the use 
of multiple search terms in one e-mail. For keyword search tests, we 
measure differences at the landlord level. Differences at the landlord 
level measure differential treatment by the same person for the same 
property. This measures net discrimination, or the difference in the 
proportion of landlords that favor whites against those that favor 
African Americans. These results are equivalent to running Probit 
regressions with landlord fixed effects, but we present them here in 
terms proportions as it also shows the percentage of landlords who 
practice equal treatment. For the time elapsed and word count tests, 
we examine differences at both the e-mail level (measuring the 
difference between group means) and the landlord level (measuring 
the difference in proportion of landlords who respond longer/faster to 
the white name). 
V. Results 
Content of response 
The positive keyword search terms, detailed in Table 1, are 
more likely to appear in replies to white names, although the majority 
of landlords treat the inquiries the same– they do not use the 
keywords at all, or they use them in both e-mails. Table 2 shows the 
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results of McNemar paired difference in proportions tests for our 
keyword searches.3 The largest difference occurs in the use of a 
greeting, where we find about 2.4% of landlords discriminate on net. 
We find that landlords are more likely to use polite language such as 
“Thanks” or “Please Call” when replying to whites than African 
Americans. The net level of discrimination for the use of polite 
language is about 2% of landlords. 
We find that landlords are more likely to offer contact 
information in the form of a phone number or e-mail address (many 
landlords initially list apartments using an anonymous Craigslist e-mail 
address, so it is meaningful to list a different means of contact) when 
corresponding with white names. The magnitudes suggest that about 
1.5% of landlords favor whites for these categories, statistically 
significant at less than the 1% level. Unequal treatment exists when 
offering to view the unit, as we find landlords are more likely to 
mention words like “view”, “tour”, or “show” to white tenants. Again, 
this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
We also find landlords are more likely to use descriptive 
language in e-mails to whites than they are to African Americans. This 
includes terms such as “new”, “clean”, and “quiet”. The size of this 
difference suggests about 1% of landlords discriminate on net with this 
measure. We do not find any difference in suggestions that other units 
are available, perhaps because this could be viewed as either a 
positive (if the current unit has been rented) or negative (if steering 
the African American to another area), so that the net effect is zero. 
While the positive search term results clearly show favorable 
treatment toward white names, the negative search term results do 
not suggest strong discrimination. Table 2 shows negative search term 
results (Fees, Employment, History, Background), broken down by the 
categories described in Table 1. Despite the egregious example in the 
introduction, we do not find statistically significant subtle 
discrimination through the use of asking about employment 
verification, rental history, or the tenant’s background. We also find no 
evidence of unequal treatment when mentioning fees or deposits 
between replies sent to white and African American names. 
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The keyword searches reveal the majority of landlords respond 
using similar language to both inquiries; however our tests show that 
discrimination still exists in the text of many replies. Net 
discrimination, measured as the difference between landlords that 
favor whites and landlords that favor African Americans, ranges from 
about 1% (using descriptive language) to about 2.4% (using a 
greeting) – always in favor of the white names. The discrimination 
toward African American names is statistically significant in all cases 
except the “other units” category. 
As a robustness check to the search terms listed in Table 1, we 
combined several alternative searches on the text of landlord replies 
and tested for differences between African American and white names. 
Table 3 shows the results of the alternative searches. They include 
searching for any negative or positive terms, combining the e-mail and 
phone categories, combining the other and view unit categories, and 
combining the greeting and polite categories. All of these searches 
yield similar results to the primary subtle discrimination tests in Table 
2. We find no difference in the use of negative search terms, but some 
differences in the use of positive search terms. The magnitude of the 
difference for our robustness checks is larger than the magnitude in 
our original searches, suggesting that extending the search to include 
more positive terms reveals more landlords who potentially practice 
subtle discrimination. 
We further extend the robustness checks to include a more 
extensive list of descriptive terms (including mentioning positive 
attributes of the surrounding neighborhood like schools, shops, and 
stores). These results are quite similar to the original descriptive 
search results, with only a slightly larger magnitude. We also search 
for terms that suggest the landlord is prompting action on the part of 
the potential tenant (quick, hurry, fast, come, visit, application, won’t 
last), but find no statistically meaningful difference. Finally, we 
searched for discouraging language such as “already rented”, “no 
longer” “not available”, but found no differences across races. The 
notes of Table 3 detail the exact search terms we use for all 
robustness checks. 
The “All Positive” and “All Negative” searches in Table 3 show 
the percentage of landlords who use any of the terms in our search 
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categories. The level of net discrimination for this category is 4.73% of 
landlords, or close to double the magnitude of the largest individual 
category. This is evidence that African Americans are more likely to 
encounter some form of subtle discrimination than they are any 
particular form. We can also determine if the same landlords 
discriminate in multiple ways (appearing in multiple categories) or 
different landlords discriminate in a few ways. Table 4 shows the 
overlap in categories for landlords who are net discriminators – those 
who reply using only positive language to whites, or only negative 
language to African Americans. We find that of the landlords using 
positive language only in e-mails to whites, the average number of 
categories is 2.14, and about 34% only appear in one category, while 
66% appear in two or more. Landlords using negative language only in 
e-mails to African Americans appear in 1.3 negative categories on 
average, and about 72% of them appear in only one category. 
Time to response 
Table 5 shows the time to response results at the e-mail and 
landlord level. Row 1 of Table 5 shows that the average time elapsed 
between the inquiry and subsequent landlord reply was 7 h and 9 min 
for e-mails from white names, and 7 h and 48 min for e-mails from 
African American names – a difference of 39 min. Column 3 of Table 5 
shows the results of a standard difference in means test that suggests 
this difference is statistically significant at just above the 5% level (p-
value of .0656).4 
The landlord level results also show that responses come 
quicker to e-mails sent from white names. These results, shown in 
rows 2 and 3 of Table 5, control for all individual landlord level 
characteristics and report the percentage of landlords who replied in 
the same amount of time (to the nearest minute), took longer to reply 
to the white name, or took longer to reply to the African American 
name. Row 2 of Table 5 reports results using all audits, while row 3 
uses only audits where the landlord replied to both e-mails. 
Using all audits (row 2 of Table 5), the landlord level results 
show that almost 37% of landlords take the same amount of time to 
reply to both e-mails. The large percentage of landlords who take 
equal time in replying is driven by the “zero” length of time for 
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landlords who do not reply to either e-mail.5 28% of landlords take 
longer to reply to the white name, while almost 35% take longer to 
respond to the African American name for a net level of discrimination 
of about 7% of landlords. Column 7 shows that this difference is 
statistically significant at less than the one-percent level using a 
McNemar paired difference in proportions test. 
Using only landlords who replied to both e-mails (row 3 of Table 
5) shows that less than 1% of landlords actually took the same 
amount of time to reply to both inquiries (these are due to automatic 
reply e-mails and responses that came within the first minute after 
inquiries were sent). 47% of landlords who replied to both e-mails 
took longer to respond to white names, while over 52% took longer to 
respond to African American names, a net level of discrimination of 
just over 5% of landlords. As shown in column 7, this measure is 
statistically significant at less than the 1% level using the McNemar 
paired difference in proportions test. 
Length of text 
Table 6 shows word count results for the text of landlord replies 
to inquiries about advertised rental housing units. The first three 
columns in Row 1 of Table 6 shows average word counts from all e-
mail replies, and include counting a zero length for non-responders. 
The average word count for white names is 25.86 words, as opposed 
to 23.70 for African American names- a difference of 2.16 words. 
Column 3 shows the results of a difference in means test that the 
difference is statistically significant at less than the 1% level. Row 3 of 
Table 6 shows that this difference increases to 3.14 words when we do 
not include e-mail responses that were the exactly the same length 
(mostly zero counts for non-response and some automatic reply e-
mails), and that the difference remains statistically significant at less 
than the 1% level using standard difference in means z tests. 
The last four columns of Table 6 shows word count results at the 
landlord level, examining the percent of landlords who make either an 
equal length reply or a longer reply to one race. Row 1 shows the 
results using all audits, while Row 2 shows results using only landlords 
who made a reply to both e-mails. The Row 1 results include counts of 
zero words for non-response and show that close to 47% of landlords 
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reply with the same number of words to both inquiries. Our results 
also show that almost 30% of landlords reply with more words to 
inquiries from white names, while only 23.5% reply with more words 
to inquiries from African American names. Net discrimination in length 
of reply occurs for about 6.5% of landlords, and this difference is 
statistically significant at less than the 1% level using the McNemar 
paired difference in proportions test. 
Row 3 of Table 6 shows that the net measure of discrimination 
is smaller, about 4% of landlords, when only using landlords that 
actually replied to both inquiries. The difference is still statistically 
significant at less than the 5% level using the McNemar paired 
difference in proportions test. This measure excludes the landlords 
that already discriminated by not replying to one of the inquiries, and 
suggests even landlords that reply to both e-mails still practice 
discrimination. Despite dropping all of the non-responses, we still see 
that over 23% of landlords send an e-mail with the same number of 
words to both inquiries. 
VI. Discussion and conclusion 
We find that landlords favor whites by responding quicker, 
writing e-mails that are longer, and using more positive language 
when replying to inquiries about rental housing. On balance, the 
keyword searches show that landlords choose to discriminate by 
encouraging white tenants through positive language instead of 
discouraging African American tenants through negative language. 
Although the experiment does not offer insight as to why this may be 
the case, one reason may be the threat of legal action. The Fair 
Housing Act explicitly states that it is illegal for landlords to 
discriminate on the basis of terms and conditions of the housing unit 
(exemplified by the “fees” subcategory). If landlords fear that explicitly 
discouraging African Americans through mention of fees or background 
checks may cause them legal trouble, they may substitute toward 
encouraging white tenants with positive language. 
To put our results in context, Hanson and Hawley (2011) find 
4.5% of landlords discriminate against African Americans on net in 
terms of response/non-response. Depending on the measure we use 
for subtle discrimination, an additional 1.08–6.78% of landlords 
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practice subtle discrimination on net. One way of viewing these results 
is that the traditional response/non-response measure underestimates 
the share of landlords who practice unequal treatment, although they 
may do it in less egregious ways than not responding to potential 
minority tenants. Another way of viewing these results is that they 
represent a different dimension of discrimination that is more difficult 
to uncover. It seems unlikely that all types of subtle discrimination we 
uncover hinder housing search as much as a non-response; 
nevertheless, they can discourage potential renters and restrict choice, 
and should be considered in the literature moving forward. 
The question remains: why do landlords discriminate against 
African Americans in the rental housing market? There is a “statistical” 
explanation, that landlords discriminate because it is in their best 
interest in terms of profit maximization, and they perceive whites to be 
more worthy tenants. There is also the taste-based view, that 
landlords have some personal preferences for tenants of one race, and 
they act on these feelings. Although the source of discrimination is 
important to understand, we believe our work is limited to describing 
how discrimination occurs, not why. For instance, landlords using a 
greeting only for white tenants could be perceived as practicing taste-
based discrimination, because a greeting is a way of being friendly 
with someone and may be indicative of personal preference. The same 
result, however, could also be explained as statistical discrimination—
landlords are friendlier with whites because they believe them to be 
better tenants, so they try to attract them to the unit. 
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1 Carpusor and Loges, 2006, Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008, Ewens et al., 
2009 and Bosch et al., 2010 and Hanson and Hawley (2011) are 
examples of e-mail correspondence studies that test for discrimination 
in housing markets using response/non-response differences. 
2 Craigslist puts a notice on every advertisement posted on the site warning 
that stating a discriminatory preference is illegal and allows users to 
easily notify them of any such advertisements. 
3 For all statistical significance tests at the landlord level (Table 2 and Table 3, 
and columns (4–7) of Table 5 and Table 6) of the difference in 
proportion of landlords between white and African American tenants, 
we use the McNemar test. This test is designed for testing the 
difference in proportion of respondents for paired subjects, the test 
statistic is χ2=(Nonly W-Nonly AA)2/(Nonly W+Nonly AA)χ2=(Nonly W-Nonly 
AA)2/(Nonly W+Nonly AA), where N represents the number of 
landlords only using language for one group. The test statistic has a 
chi-squared distribution, and we calculate all p-values accordingly. 
4 This test is at the e-mail level, average times do not include non-responses. 
E-mail level tests are not paired tests, they are standard difference in 
means z tests. 
5 1151 of the 1161 equal time responses were no reply or ‘zero’ length. 
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Table 1. Keyword groups used for e-mail correspondence searches. 
Positive language categories 
Descriptive New, new Clean, clean Quiet, quiet Nice, nice Good, good  
Other units Another, another Second, second Several, several    







Email @ Email, email Contact, contact    
Phone 
⧹(?[0-9][0-9][0-9]⧹)⧹(?[0-9][0-9][0-9]⧹)?[-]*[0–9] [0–9] [0–9][-]*[0–9] [0–9] [0–9] 
[0–9] 
Greeting Hi, hi Hello, hello Hey, hey Dear, dear   




























Eviction, eviction     





Verify, verify   
 











Ho: Rw − RAA = 0 
Total audits: 3153 
Descriptive 91.53% 3.33% 3.11% 2.03% 1.08% 
 [2886] [105] [98] [64] p = 0.0076*** 
Other units 96.61% 0.79% 1.43% 1.17% 0.26% 
 [3046] [25] [45] [37] p = 0.4397 
View unit 73.10% 13.57% 7.42% 5.90% 1.52% 
 [2305] [428] [234] [186] p = 0.0235** 
Email 89.88% 4.73% 3.43% 1.97% 1.46% 
 [2834] [149] [108] [62] p = 0.0005*** 
Phone number 77.77% 12.31% 5.74% 4.19% 1.55% 
 [2452] [388] [181] [132] p = 0.0066*** 
Greeting 59.31% 20.71% 11.20% 8.79% 2.41% 
 [1870] [653] [353] [277] p = 0.0028*** 
Polite 64.00% 19.00% 9.51% 7.48% 2.03% 
 [2018] [599] [300] [236] p = 0.0065*** 
Fees 93.63% 3.27% 1.33% 1.78% −0.45% 
 [2952] [103] [42] [56] p = 0.1888 
Employment 96.96% 1.30% 0.79% 0.95% −0.16% 
 [3057] [41] [25] [30] p = 0.5901 
History 98.70% 0.38% 0.44% 0.48% −0.04% 
 [3112] [12] [14] [15] p = 1.0000 
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Ho: Rw − RAA = 0 
Background 97.24% 1.27% 0.82% 0.67% 0.15% 
 [3066] [40] [26] [21] p = 0.5601 
Notes: See Table 1 for contents of keyword searches. p-values are from McNemar 















Ho: Rw − RAA = 0 
Total audits: 3153 
All negative 
terms 
90.29% 4.66% 2.70% 2.35% 0.35% 
 [2847] [147] [85] [74] p = 0.4278 
All positive 
terms 
42.59% 35.81% 13.16% 8.44% 4.73% 
 [1343] [1129] [415] [266] p = 0.0000*** 
E-mail or phone 72.82% 14.62% 7.42% 5.14% 2.28% 
 [2296] [461] [234] [162] p = 0.0003*** 
Other or view 
unit 
63.18% 14.11% 12.56% 10.15% 2.41% 
 [1992] [445] [396] [320] p = 0.0050*** 
Greeting or 
polite 
49.03% 29.21% 12.72% 9.04% 3.68% 
 [1546] [921] [401] [285] p = 0.0000*** 
Extended 
descriptive 
90.10% 4.00% 3.55% 2.35% 1.21% 
 [2841] [126] [112] [74] p = 0.0347** 
Encourage 
action 
82.02% 8.63% 4.95% 4.41% 0.54% 
 [2586] [272] [156] [139] p = 0.3516 
Discourage 95.62% 1.30% 1.68% 1.36% 0.32% 
 [3015] [41] [53] [43] p = 0.2837 
Notes: All negative terms is a search for any of the terms from all of the negative 
search categories. All positive terms is a search for any of the terms from all of the 
positive search categories. Extended descriptive includes all of the original words in 
the descriptive category plus the following: large, spacious, bright, neighbor, school, 
store, shop. The Encourage action category includes the keywords: fast, quick, hurry, 
fill out, drop, stop, come, visit, application, won’t last, soon. The Discourage category 
includes the keywords: someone else, already rented, other, are you sure? afford, no 
longer, not available, sorry. p-values are from McNemar paired difference in 
proportions tests. Number of Landlords in []. 
** 0.05 significance. 
*** 0.01 significance. 
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Table 4. Discriminating landlords in multiple categories. 
 Average Number of categories 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Positive language to 
white only (415 total) 
2.14 33.98% 33.01% 21.20% 9.40% 1.20% 0.96% 0.24% 
  [141] [137] [88] [39] [5] [4] [1] 
Negative language to 
African American only 
(74 total) 
1.32 71.62% 24.32% 4.05% 0.00%    
  [53] [18] [3] [0] – – – 
Number of Landlords in [], total number of landlords in each row is the total 
number of landlords who replied using at least one form of positive (negative) 
language as measured by the categories in Table 2. Average is the average 
number of categories a landlord who is in at least one category appears in. 
 


















Ho: Rw − RAA = 0 
Time elapsed 
all audits 
7:09 7:48 0:39*     




   36.82% 28.20% 34.98% -6.78% 




to both races 
   
0.74% 47.02% 52.25% −5.23% 
[10] [638] [709] p = 0.009*** 
Notes: Row 1 shows the average time elapsed between when an inquiry is sent and 
when a landlord reply is received, reported in h:mm format, these averages do not 
include e-mails where no reply was made, p-value for Row 1 results if from a standard 
difference in means z test. Row 2, reports the percentage of audits where landlords 
replied in the same amount of time (measured to the minute), took longer to reply to 
the white name, or took longer to reply to the African American name using all audits. 
Row 2 results include landlords that did not reply to one race, row 3 reports the same 
statistic as row 2 with the calculation made for only landlords who replied to both e-
mails. p-values from Row 2 and 3 are from McNemar paired difference in proportions 
test. Standard Deviations are reported in (), number of landlords reported in []. 
* 0.10 significance. 
*** 0.01 significance. 
 
  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Housing Economics, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 2011): pg. 276-284. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this 
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
21 
 
















Ho: Rw − RAA = 0 
Words in all 
audits 
25.86 23.7 2.16*** 46.72% 29.78% 23.50% 6.28% 
 (51.39) (51.32) p = 0.002 [1473] [939] [741] p = 0.000*** 
Words, reply 
to both races 
   23.58% 40.24% 36.18% 4.06% 






31.5 28.36 3.14***     
 (50.18) (50.40) p = 0.000     
Notes: Columns (1)–(3) use word counts from all e-mails, while columns (4)–(7) use 
landlord level replies. Row 1 examines the word count for all audits and includes 
counting non-response as zero words. p-values in columns (1)–(3) results are from 
standard difference in means z tests. p-values in columns (4)–(6) are from McNemar 
paired difference in means tests. Row 2 examines only landlords that replied to both 
e-mails. Row 3 excludes replies that were of equal length and does not count non-
responses. Standard Deviations are reported in (), number of landlords reported in []. 
** 0.05 significance. 
*** 0.01 significance. 
 
 
